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STATEMENT OF THE ISS0ES 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial cou|rt have jurisdiction to 
enter default and default judgment without actual service of 
process on Appellant? 
ISSUE NO 2: Did the court erlr in entering default 
judgment when the record did not reflect a showing of reasonable 
diligence to find Appellant's registered lagent at the registered 
office as required by 16-10-13(2) U.C.A. before electing to serve 
process through the statutory registered agent? 
ISSUE NO. 3: Did the court err by allowing Respondent to 
make a record showing reasonable diligence through an amended 
affidavit of nonservice of process which included forty (40) 
alleged attempts of service of process th|at took place at least 
four months prior to the amended affidavit being submitted. 
ISSUE NO. 4: If this court finds that service of process 
was perfected pursuant to 16-10-13(2) ip.C.A., was the trial 
court's failure to grant Appellant's M0tion to Set Aside the 
Default Judgment, nonetheless, an abuse of discretion? 
RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
1. U.R.C.P. 4(e)(4). Personal service in the state. 
"Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided 
for, upon a partnership or olther unincorporated 
association which is subject to suit under a common name, 
be delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a managing or 
general agent, or to any other agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service of process and, 
if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive 
|es, by also mailing a 
fficer or agent can be 
service and the statute so requir 
copy to the defendant. If no such ol 
found in the county in which the action is brought, then 
upon any such officer or agent, or any clerk, cashier, 
managing agent, chief clerk, or cither agent having the 
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management, direction or control of any property of such 
corporation, partnership or other unincorporated 
association within the state. If no such officer or agent 
can be found in the state, and the defendant has, or 
advertises or holds itself out as having, an officer or 
place of business in this state, or does business in this 
state, then upon the person doing such business or in 
charge of such office or place of business." 
2. U.R.C.P. 55(c). Setting aside default. 
"For good cause shown the court may set aside an 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been 
entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 
60(b)." 
3. U.R.C.P. 60(b). Relief from judgment or order. 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . ." 
4. 16-10-13 (2) U.C.A. Service of process on 
corporation - registered agent or division director as agents for 
receipt of service. 
"Whenever a corporation fails to appoint or maintain 
a registered agent to this state, or whenever its 
registered agent cannot with reasonable diligence be found 
at the registered office, the director of the division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code is the agent of the 
corporation upon whom any process, notice, or demand may 
be served. Service on the director of the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code of any process, notice or 
demand shall be made by delivering to and leaving with 
him, or with any clerk having charge of the corporation 
department of that office, an original and one copy of the 
process, notice, or demand. In the event any process, 
notice, or demand is served on the director of the 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, he shall 
immediately cause one of the copies to be forwarded by 
registered or certified mail, addressed to the corporation 
at its registered office. Any service upon the director 
of the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall 
be returnable in not less than 30 days." 
5. U.R.C.P. 4(h). Amendment. 
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"At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as 
its deems just, the court may allow any processor proof of 
service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly appears 
that material prejudice would result to the substantial 
rights of the party against who the process is issued." 
STATEMENT OF THE CA^E 
This case involves an effort on the part of Respondent to 
collect from Appellant sums allegedly due and owing on a contract 
for seed. Appellant, an earthen contractor, performed a contract 
for the BLM which involved clearing and reseeding an area of land 
administered by the BLM, Appellant contracted with Respondent 
for seed necessary to perform its BLM contract. In bringing its 
action for collection upon Appellant, Respondent allegedly 
attempted service of process upon Appellant by placing its 
complaint in the hands of Brent Hood, a deputy constable in and 
for Salt Lake County. Brent Hood was allegedly not able to 
effect service of process on Appellant. Respondent, through 
Brent Hood, attempted service of process by sending its summons 
and complaint to the statutory registered agent at the Department 
of Business Regulations. The Department of Business Regulations 
sent a copy of the summons and complaint by certified mail to the 
address of the registered agent at the registered office. The 
certified mail containing the summons and complaint sent by the 
Department of Business Regulations was apparently returned to 
them unclaimed. 
Appellant's president and registered agent, Richard Smith, 
is also a job superintendent for Appellant. Part of Richard 
Smith's duties as job superintendent requires him to occasionally 
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be away from home supervising construction projects during the 
weekdays. Such was the case from August 1986 through November 
1986. In September, upon returning from supervising one of 
Appellant's work projects, Richard Smith learned that a 
registered letter had been sent to Appellant. Richard Smith 
promptly went to the post office to claim the letter only to 
learn it had been returned to the Department of Business 
Regulations. Appellant never received notice of the pending 
action against it. After the registered mail was returned 
unclaimed, Respondent obtained a default certificate and default 
judgment against Appellant in the amount of $52,836.20. 
Appellant disputes liability for much of this amount. It was 
only after Respondent made an effort to collect on its judgment 
that Appellant learned of the default judgment entered against 
it. Defendent filed the motion to set aside the default and 
default judgment. Appellantfs motion to set aside default and 
default judgment was denied in a memorandum decision by Judge 
Leonard Russon from which Appellant appeals to this honorable 
court. 
The principal facts which are relevant to the issues 
presented for review in this appeal are as follows: 
1. Respondent's complaint was filed in District Court on 
or about July 10, 1986. (See Exhibit "A"). 
2. On or about the 25th day of July, Respondent caused 
the summons and complaint to be placed in the hands of Brent 
Hood, a deputy constable for Salt Lake County, for service of 
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process on Appellant. Brent Hood was allegedly not able to 
effect service of process on Appellant, n6r did he allege to have 
tried. (See Exhibit "B"). 
3. On or about the 12th day of September, 1986, Brent K. 
Hood caused two copies of the summons and| complaint to be served 
upon Cathy Russell, a statutory agent fori service of process, at 
the Department of Business Regulation. ]Brent Hood's return of 
service shows only that he served two copies of the summons and 
complaint on "Russell, Cathy — SEC corporations". No showing 
i 
or allegation of reasonable diligence was Reflected in his return 
of service dated September 12, 1986, (See Exhibit "B"). 
4. On or about the 12th day of September, 1986, the 
Department of Business Regulations Corporate Division caused a 
copy of the summons and complaint to be mailed by certified mail 
to Appellant in care of Richard W. Smith at 5748 Marco Road, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84121. 
5. Based on return of service, Respondent prepared and 
filed a certificate of default and on or about November 12, 1986, 
default judgment was entered against Appellant (See Exhibit "C"). 
6. On or about November 17, 1986^ Respondent caused to 
be mailed a notice of entry of default to Appellant c/o Richard 
Smith, 5748 Marco Road, Salt Lake City, Ut&h 84121 (See Exhibit 
"D") . 
7. Appellant is a small construction company having 
relatively few employees and no full time office personnel or 
staff (See Exhibit "E"). 
8. R i c h a r d Smith has been t h e p r e s i d e n t and r e g i s t e r e d 
a g e n t of A p p e l l a n t s i n c e March 8 f 1967 (See E x h i b i t " E " ) . 
9 . R i c h a r d Smith i s a l s o a c o n s t r u c t i o n s u p e r i n t e n d e n t 
for A p p e l l a n t and i s i n v o l v e d in t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n a c t i v i t i e s of 
A p p e l l a n t on a d a i l y b a s i s (See E x h i b i t " E " ) • 
10 . B e c a u s e R i c h a r d S m i t h i s a c o n s t r u c t i o n 
s u p e r i n t e n d e n t for A p p e l l a n t , he i s o c c a s i o n a l l y r e q u i r e d to work 
o u t s i d e of S a l t Lake Coun ty . Such a work s c h e d u l e o c c a s i o n a l l y 
r e q u i r e s t h a t Mr . S m i t h o b t a i n t e m p o r a r y l o d g i n g a t t h e 
c o n s t r u c t i o n l o c a l e d u r i n g t h e work week, t h u s l e a v i n g no one a t 
t h e r e g i s t e r e d o f f i c e d u r i n g normal b u s i n e s s h o u r s on t h e s e d a y s . 
(See E x h i b i t " E " ) . 
1 1 . The r e g i s t e r e d o f f i c e of A p p e l l a n t i s a l s o t h e 
p e r s o n a l r e s i d e n c e of R i c h a r d S m i t h . (See E x h i b i t " E " ) . 
1 2 . A p p e l l a n t ' s r e g i s t e r e d a g e n t and c o n s t r u c t i o n 
s u p e r i n t e n d e n t , R i c h a r d S m i t h , was i n v o l v e d i n s e v e r a l 
c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o j e c t s o u t s i d e of t h e S a l t Lake County a r e a d u r i n g 
t h e t ime p e r i o d from J u l y 1986 t h r o u g h November of 1986 (See 
E x h i b i t "E") . 
1 3 . The wife of A p p e l l a n t ' s r e g i s t e r e d a g e n t r e s i d e s a t 
t h e r e g i s t e r e d o f f i c e and i s a lmos t a lways t h e r e e x c e p t d u r i n g 
t h e h o u r s of 8:00 a .m. to 5:00 p .m. Monday t h r o u g h F r i d a y when 
she i s g a i n f u l l y employed e l s e w h e r e (See E x h i b i t " F " ) . 
14 . A p p e l l a n t ' s r e g i s t e r e d a g e n t n e v e r a t t e m p t e d t o 
c o n c e a l h i m s e l f or avo id s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s a n d , i n f a c t , was 
t o t a l l y unaware t h a t Respondent was t r y i n g to e f f e c t s e r v i c e of 
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process upon Appellant (See Exhib i t " E " ) . 
15 . A p p e l l a n t d i s p u t e s , t he invoice u n i t p r i c e and the 
i n v o i c e q u a n t i t y of seed for which p l a i n t i f f c l a i m s i t i s 
e n t i t l e d to payment for (See Exhib i t "E") v 
16. A p p e l l a n t agreed to pay th^ higher p r i c e for seed 
a s s e r t e d by Respondent if and only if Appel lant was successfu l in 
i t s claim aga ins t the government for a d d i t i o n a l sums due for the 
p r o j e c t the seed was provided for (See Exh ib i t " E " ) . 
17. Respondent has f a i l ed to shov^ any ac tua l s e rv i ce of 
process upon Appel lant p r i o r to ob ta in ing i t s d e f a u l t judgment 
and c e r t i f i c a t e on the 10th day of November, 1986. 
18. R e s p o n d e n t ' s c o n s t a b l e ' s r e t u r n of s e r v i c e da t ed 
September 12 f 1986, s t a t e s on ly t h a t Bren t Hood r e c e i v e d a 
summons and c o m p l a i n t and se rved two copies of the same upon 
" R u s s e l l , Cathy — SEC C o r p o r a t i o n s " . Nowhere in the c o n s t a b l e ' s 
r e t u r n d o e s i t a l l e g e a t t e m p t s of s e r v i c e on A p p e l l a n t ' s 
r e g i s t e r e d agent and nowhere does i t a l l e g e reasonab le d i l i g e n c e 
to find A p p e l l a n t ' s r e g i s t e r e d agent (See Exhib i t "B") . 
19. In c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h R e s p o n d e n t ' s a f f i d a v i t in 
oppos i t i on to A p p e l l a n t ' s motion to s e t asi|de d e f a u l t and d e f a u l t 
judgment, i t a t tached t h e r e t o two amended c o n s t a b l e ' s r e tu rn of 
nonserv ice dated January 15 , 1987, signed bly Constable John Sindt 
and not by Deputy Constable Brent Hood, wherein each a f f i d a v i t of 
nonserv ice a l leged a t l e a s t 20 a t t empts r e s p e c t i v e l y on Gary R. 
Smi th and on R i c h a r d Smith c l a i m i n g ttyat n e i t h e r was ever 
a v a i l a b l e for s e r v i c e (See Exhib i t "G") . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. It is uncontroverted that no actual notice of process 
was ever effected on Appellant. Therefore, notice as required by 
due process of law was not had and the court did not have 
jurisdiction to enter default. 
2. Respondent did not meet its burden of reasonable 
diligence as required by 16-10-13(2) U.C.A. Respondent first put 
a copy of the summons and complaint in the hands of Deputy 
Constable Brent Hood who filed an affidavit stating only that he 
served Cathy Russell — Sec. Corporations with two copies of the 
summons and complaint. No claim, or basis for a claim, of 
reasonable diligence was ever asserted in any affidavit of 
service. Therefore, Respondent relied on the provisions of 16-
10-13(2) U.C.A. to serve process on Respondent without first 
showing reasonable diligence to serve Appellant otherwise. 
Respondent's failure to provide a showing of reasonable diligence 
as required by 16-10-13(2) U.C.A. makes statutory service of 
process defective and vacates the district court's jurisdiction 
to enter judgment in this matter. 
3. The trial court erred by allowing Respondent to amend 
its affidavit of return of nonservice to show at least 20 
attempts on Gary Smith from the 25th day of July, 1986, through 
the 10th day of September, 1986; and further, 20 attempts made 
upon Richard Smith between the 25th day of July, 1986, through 
September 10, 1986. Rule 4(h) U.R.C.P. allows for amendment of 
return of service "unless it clearly appears that material 
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p r e j u d i c e w i l l r e s u l t to t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of the p a r t y 
a g a i n s t whom the p r o c e s s i s i s s u e d . " A p p e l l a n t a s s e r t s t h a t 
R e s p o n d e n t ' s p r o c e s s s e r v e r e i t h e r d id not have p e r s o n a l 
knowledge or could not c l e a r l y r e c o l l e d t 40 such a t t e m p t s to 
s e r v e p r o c e s s four months p r i o r to i t s amended a f f i d a v i t / and 
f u r t h e r notes t h a t Respondent ' s process Server did not document 
d a t e s and t i m e s of a t t e m p t e d s e r v i c l e , t h e r e f o r e , such an 
amendment of r e t u r n of s e r v i c e c l e a r l y p r e j u d i c e s the s u b s t a n t i a l 
r i g h t s of A p p e l l a n t in cont r o v e n t i on cjf what the s t a t u t e was 
intended to provide fo r . 
4 . Even i f t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y found t h a t 
Respondent had per fec ted s e r v i c e of process upon Appe l l an t , Rule 
55(c) U .R.C.P . and Rule 60(b)(1) U.R.C.Pj. p rovide a remedy for 
r e l i e f from j u d g m e n t i f t h e e n d s of j u s t i c e so d i c t a t e . 
Appel lant d i s p u t e s the invoice q u a n t i t y arid invoice p r i c e of i t s 
c o n t r a c t with Respondent. Ample case law ^nd no t ions of f a i r n e s s 
w i t h i n our Anglo-Saxon system of j u s t i c e d i c t a t e s t h a t m a t t e r s 
such as t h i s should be reso lved upon the m e r i t s . 
To r e q u i r e Appellant to h i r e a ful]L time s t a f f member to 
ac t as r e g i s t e r e d a g e n t who would be a v a i l a b l e a t a l l t i m e s 
d u r i n g b u s i n e s s hours would opera te as a s u b s t a n t i a l burden on 
Appel lant and a l l b u s i n e s s e s s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d . A p p e l l a n t ' s 
r e g i s t e r e d agent never at tempted to conceal and s e c r e t himself 
from s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s . The only conce ivab le no t i ce A p p e l l a n t ' s 
r e g i s t e r e d a g e n t , Richard Smith, could be found to have had was 
t h a t a l e t t e r had been sen t to Appel lant c /0 Richard Smith by the 
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Department of Business Regulations (see Exhibit "H") . Upon 
getting notice of certified mail, Mr. Smith promptly went to the 
post office only to find the letter had been returned. Mr. 
Smith's inattendance to follow up on the letter was excusable 
neglect within the purview of Rule 60(b)(1) U.R.C.P. if anything 
is. There is ample case law supporting the proposition that this 
was the intended interpretation and remedy of Rule 60(b)(1) 
U.R.C.P. Therefore, the trial court's failure to overturn the 
default and default judgment and allow a trial on the merits is 
an abuse of discretion and would operate to impose an unjust 
burden on all small businesses unable to afford full time 
registered agents. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I; NOTICE AS REQUIRED BY DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
Appellant first contends that service of process was never 
perfected upon it and, therefore, the trial court did not have 
jurisdiction to enter judgment against it. It is uncontroverted 
that Appellant had no actual notice of service of process. In 
fact, the only notice Appellant ever got prior to notice of 
default judgment was notice of a certified letter. Appellant's 
registered agent, Richard Smith, promptly followed went to claim 
notice o'f the certified letter only to find it had been returned 
to sender. Rule 4(e) U.R.C.P. provides that personal service 
within the state shall be effected upon any corporation: 
"by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a 
managing or general agent, or to any other agent 
authorized by appointment of law to receive such 
service of process and, if the agent is one 
10 
authorized by statute to receive service and the 
statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the 
defendant." 
Service of process is deemed ineffective and may be 
quashed if the burden of reasonable dliligence is not met. 
Respondent must show that it took steps actually calculated to 
apprise Appellant, through service of pr0cess, that its rights 
were in jeopardy. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in Graham v. Sawaya, 632 P.2d 
851 (1981) that: 
ication and by 
defendant whose 
and who had not 
"default judgment in personam could not be entered 
in cases in which the only servic^ of process or 
notice of the action was by pub! 
mailing to last known address of a 
then present address was unknown 
been found after diligent inquiry." 
The Graham Court further stated: 
"The due process clauses of the Uriited States and 
Utah constitutions require notice to a party before 
his or her rights are affected by judgment." 
The Graham Court quoting the landmark United States 
Supreme Court case of Mullane v. Central ijtenover Bank and Trust, 
Co., 339 U.S. 306, (1950) stated: 
"But when notice is a person's duel, process which 
is a mere gesture is not due process. That means 
employed must be such as one desirbus of actually 
informing the absentee might reasonable adopt to 
accomplish it." 
While the holding of the Graham £ase is aimed more at 
notice by publication, the principle it quoted from Mullan is 
pertinent to the instant case, i.e. due process requires notice. 
POINT lit NO REASONABLE DILIGENCE SHOWN 
BEFORE RELYING ON 16-10-13(2) 
U.C.A. 
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The process se rver c e r t a i n l y would have observed t h a t the 
r e g i s t e r e d o f f i c e was a p e r s o n a l r e s i d e n c e a s w e l l as t h e 
c o r p o r a t e o f f i ce of Appel lant and would reasonably conclude t h a t 
a l l p a r t i e s r e s i d i n g t h e r e i n were a t work t h r o u g h the day and 
would , t h e r e f o r e , have made some e f f o r t to serve A p p e l l a n t ' s 
r e g i s t e r e d agent some t ime a f t e r 5:00 p .m. on weekdays or on 
weekends. Respondent has made no c la ims t h a t any e f f o r t was made 
to se rve process a f t e r the hours of 5:00 p.m. or on weekends . 
Even if he had, the a f f i d a v i t of the wife of the r e g i s t e r e d agent 
would serve to r ebu t any such a l l e g a t i o n s . 
R e s p o n d e n t never o b t a i n e d p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over 
A p p e l l a n t by e f f e c t i n g s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s on i t s r e g i s t e r e d 
a g e n t , i t has r e l i e d c h i e f l y upon the p r o v i s i o n s of 16-10-13(2) 
U.C.A. which provides in p e r t i n e n t p a r t : 
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 W h e n e v e r i t s r e g i s t e r e d a g e n t c a n n o t w i t h 
reasonab le d i l i g e n c e be found a t t h e r e g i s t e r e d 
o f f i c e , t h e n t h e d i r e c t o r of t h e D i v i s i o n of 
Corpora t ions and Commercial Code i s t h e agen t of 
the co rpora t ion upon who any process . . . may be 
s e r v e d . " 
The key words of t h i s s t a t u t o r y p rov i s ion a re "with reasonable 
d i l i g e n c e " . In i t s o r i g i n a l r e t u r n of s e r v i c e , R e s p o n d e n t ' s 
p rocess s e r v e r , Brent Hood, never a l leged reasonab le d i l i g e n c e . 
All the c o n s t a b l e ' s r e t u r n says was t h a t he rece ived a copy of 
the summons and complaint on the 25th day of Ju ly and served the 
same upon Cathy Russe l l - - s e c . c o r p o r a t i o n s . No men t ion was 
made of any e f f o r t to serve d e f e n d a n t ' s r e g i s t e r e d agent or any 
of d e f e n d a n t ' s o f f i c e r s . The cour t would f u r t h e r no t e t h a t a 
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t o t a l fee of $24 .75 ( see E x h i b i t "Bn) wa$ cha rged fo r s e r v i c e of 
p r o c e s s . C e r t a i n l y such a fee would not r e f l e c t 40 a t t e m p t s to 
s e r v e a summons and c o m p l a i n t on R icha rd Smith and Gary Smith as 
a l l e g e d in i t s amended a f f i d a v i t . No a c t u a l n o t i c e of p r o c e s s 
was had on A p p e l l a n t ' s r e g i s t e r e d agen t ^nd r e l i a n c e upon 1 6 - 1 0 -
13(2) U.C.A. w i t h o u t a s h o w i n g of r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e makes 
s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s d e f e c t i v e and n u l l i f i e s t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of 
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t to e n t e r d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t . 
POINT I I I : ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ALLOW 
AMENDMENT OF AFFIDAVIT. 
i • 
Rule 4(h) U.R.C.P. p rovides t h a t an| a f f i d a v i t of r e t u r n of 
s e r v i c e may be amended 
"un less i t c l e a r l y appears t h a t m a t e r i a l p re jud ice 
would r e s u l t to the s u b s t a n t i a l r i g p t s of the p a r t y 
a g a i n s t who t h e p r o c e s s i s i s s u e d " . [Emphasis 
added ] 
In t h e c a s e of C a m s v . C a m s , 668 P.2d 555 ( 1 9 8 3 ) , 
J u s t i c e Durham s t a t e d t h a t : 
"Although a s h e r i f f ' s r e t u r n of s e r v i c e of process 
i s presumed to be c o r r e c t , i t i s p r ima f a c i a 
e v i d e n c e of t h e f a c t s s t a t e d t h e r e i n , t h e 
i n v a l i d i t y or absence of s e r v i c e of p rocess can be 
shown by c l e a r and convincing ev idence . " 
Respondent ' s f i r s t r e t u r n of s e r v i c ^ did not show t h a t any 
a t t e m p t s were made t o s e r v e p r o c e s s £ t t h e o f f i c e of t h e 
r e g i s t e r e d agen t , l e t a l o n e any a t t e m p t s b e f o r e 8:00 a.m. or 
a f t e r 5:00 p .m. T h e r e f o r e , p l a i n t i f f did not show reasonable 
d i l i g e n c e as required by Graham v. Sawaya and 16 -10-13(2 ) . The 
a f f i d a v i t of the r e g i s t e r e d a g e n t ' s w i f e , Ba rba ra Smi th , ( see 
Exhib i t "F") shows by c l e a r and convincing! evidence as ou t l ined 
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i n C a m s v . C a m s , t h a t R e s p o n d e n t ' s p r o c e s s s e r v e r could n o t 
have made any d i l i g e n t a t t e m p t t o s e r v e p r o c e s s a t any o t h e r t ime 
o t h e r t h a n 8:00 a .m. t o 5:00 p . m . . Monday t h r o u g h F r i d a y . 
In r e s p o n s e to A p p e l l a n t ' s mot ion t o s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t 
j u d g m e n t , Respondent f i l e d an a f f i d a v i t and a l s o f i l e d an amended 
r e t u r n of n o n s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s a s an a t t a c h m e n t t o i t s 
a f f i d a v i t . The amended r e t u r n of n o n s e r v i c e a t t e m p t e d t o s e t 
f o r t h a showing of r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e by a s s e r t i n g no l e s s than 
20 a t t e m p t s on Gary Smith and no l e s s t h a n 20 a t t e m p t s on R icha rd 
S m i t h w i t h o u t c i t i n g d a t e s and t i m e s of s u c h a t t e m p t s . As 
s t a t e d , A p p e l l a n t ' s r e g i s t e r e d a g e n t ' s w i f e , B a r b a r a S m i t h , 
a s s e r t s in t h a t s h e r e s i d e s a t t h e r e g i s t e r e d o f f i c e and i s 
r e g u l a r l y t h e r e e x c e p t d u r i n g t h e h o u r s of 8:00 a .m. t o 5:00 p .m. 
Monday t h r o u g h F r i d a y . T h e r e f o r e , R e s p o n d e n t ' s b l a n k e t a t t e m p t 
a t showing r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e i s r e b u t t e d f i r s t f o r l a c k of 
s u b s t a n t i a t i o n and f o u n d a t i o n and s e c o n d l y by t h e a f f i d a v i t of 
A p p e l l a n t ' s r e g i s t e r e d a g e n t ' s w i f e . 
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s a l l o w a n c e of s u c h an amendment of 
s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s to show r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e c l e a r l y o p e r a t e s 
a s a s u b s t a n t i a l p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t t h e r i g h t s of A p p e l l a n t no t 
i n t e n d e d by Rule 4(h) U . R . C . P . Such a l l o w a n c e by t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
i s an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . 
POINT IV: ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO NOT SET ASIDE JUDGMENT. 
Even i f t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y found t h a t s e r v i c e of 
p r o c e s s had been p e r f e c t e d by s e r v i c e upon t h e s t a t u t o r y a g e n t , 
Cathy R u s s e l l , A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l to 
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s e t a s i d e t he d e f a u l t and d e f a u l t judglment was none the less an 
abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . Rule 55(c) U.R.C.P* and Rule 6 0 ( b ) ( 1 ) 
U . R . C . P . p rov ide for s e t t i n g a s ide d e f a u l t and r e l i e f from the 
ope ra t ion of judgment if the ends of j u s t i c e r e q u i r e i t . Rule 
55(c) s t a t e s 
"For good cause showf the cour t may se t a s i de an 
en t ry of d e f a u l t , and, if judgment: by d e f a u l t has 
b e e n e n t e r e d , may l i k e w i s e s e t i t a s i d e in 
accordance with Rule 6 0 ( b ) . " 
Rule 60(b)(1) states in pertinent part: 
"On motion and upon such terms a$ are just, the 
court, may in the furtherance of justice, relieve a 
party or his legal representative from final 
judgment, order or proceeding fbr the following 
reasons: (1) . . . mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect;" 
On the facts, this case clearly falls within the category 
of excusable neglect as provided for in Rup.e 60(b)(1). 
Appellant is a small corporation engaged in the 
construction business, primarily earth moving work. It employs 
no full time staff and its officers and directors must wear more 
than one hat. Richard Smith is Appellant1£ president, registered 
agent and one of its construction superintendents. Mr. Smith is 
required as part of his duties as a construction superintendent 
to frequently be away from the registered office during the work 
week. During the period of time from July! 1986 through November 
1986, Richard Smith frequently was forced i to take up temporary 
lodging away from Salt Lake County on various job locations to 
oversee Appellant's business. 
Upon returning from one such construction project in mid-
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September of 1986, Richard Smith learned that a registered letter 
had been sent to Appellant in care of him. He promptly went to 
the post office to claim it only to find that it had been 
returned to the Department of Business Regulations. While 
Appellant concedes that Mr. Smith could have inquired further 
with the Department of Business Regulation as to the nature of 
the registered letter , his neglect in doing so was certainly 
excusable neglect. Such a letter from the Department of Business 
Regulations could have represented any number of things such as 
notice that the annual stockholder's report had not been filed, 
tax deficiency, etc. However, in the greatest stretch of the 
imagination, such notice of a registered letter could not be 
construed as notice of pending litigation wherein Appellant's 
rights were jeopardized. 
Appellant's registered agent, Richard Smith, at no time 
attempted to conceal or secret himself from service of process. 
In fact, at no time did Richard Smith have any indictation that 
someone was attempting to serve process on Appellant through him. 
To require Appellant or similarly situated businesses to hire or 
maintain a full time registered agent for service of process 
would operate as an unjust burden on all small businesses. 
Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) U.R.C.P., relief from judgment 
may be had for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; or pursuant to 60(b)(7) for any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment. Our Anglo-Saxon 
system of justice is based on notions of justice and fair play. 
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Any n o t i o n s of f a i r n e s s cannot circumvent the requirement for 
n o t i c e as r e q u i r e d by due p r o c e s s of l a w . A g a i n , i t i s 
uncont rove r t ed t h a t d e f e n d a n t had no tac tua l knowledge and we 
a rgue t h a t a n o t i c e of r e t u r n e d c e r t i f i e d m a i l d o e s no t 
c o n s t i t u t e c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e . A p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e to follow up 
on the post o f f i ce r e c e i p t for the c e r t i f i e d mail c e r t a i n l y f a l l s 
i n t o t h e c a t e g o r y of excusable neg lec t if anything does . The 
d e f e n d a n t ' s r e g i s t e r e d agen t had no w^y of knowing what t h e 
p o s t m a n ' s r e c e i p t m e a n t . A p p e l l a n t s imply wants h i s day in 
c o u r t . 
The C o u r t in Board of E d u c a t i o h , t h e G r a n i t e School 
D i s t r i c t v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806 s t a t e d : 
"The Courts wi l l g e n e r a l l y g ran t re | l ie f in doubtful 
cases so t h a t a p a r t y may have a h e a r i n g . " 
The Cox Court q u o t i n g Warren v. Dickson Ranch Co. , 260 
P.2d 741 s t a t e s : 
"The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a 
creature of equity designed to relieve against 
harshness of enforcing judgment, jwhich may occur 
through procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the 
opposing party, or misfortunates, which prevent 
presentation of a claim for defense^" 
In the Cox case, the Court looked kt the same provisions 
of Rule 60(b) that defendant is advancing to this court: 1) one 
mistake in advertence, surprise, or excusjable neglect; 2) any 
other reason justifying relief from jzhe operation of the 
judgment. 
Appellant distinguishes its facts from that of the Cox 
case. In Cox, the defendant had actually been served process 
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(summons and complaint), but defendant, because he thought it was 
insufficient on its face, did not answer. Appellant in the 
instant case had no notice, no service of process, nothing which 
alerted it that its rights were being jeopardized. Therefore, 
the principle outlined in the Cox case ought to be applied. To 
quote the words of Justice Wade in his dissent: 
111 think it obviously an abuse of discretion for 
the trial court to refuse to set aside this 
default. The purpose of courts is to decide 
questions of law and facts on their merit after a 
fair and impartial trial, and promote justice under 
the law. Decisions on procedural defects should 
not be encouraged." 
In Central Finance Company v. Kynaston, 452 P.2d 316, 
defendant and counsel for defendant failed to appear on the day 
of trial. The trial court entered default in favor of plaintiff 
and refused to set it aside upon Defendant's motion. Defendant 
appealed. Kynaston alleged that his defense counsel had not been 
given notice of the trial setting and claimed it an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court, upon defendant's Motion, not to 
set aside the default judgment. The Supreme Court remanded the 
case to the trial court to determine whether there was compliance 
with Rule 11 of the Second Judicial District in regard to the 
requisite notice to defendant's counsel regarding trial setting 
stating 
" . . . I t i s q u i t e uniformly regarded as an abuse 
of d i s c r e t i o n t o r e f u s e to v a c a t e a d e f a u l t 
judgment where t h e r e i s reasonable j u s t i f i c a t i o n or 
excuse for the d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e to appear , and 
t imely a p p l i c a t i o n i s made to se t i t a s i d e . " 
In Mayhew v, Standard G i l s o n i t e Company, 376 P.2d 951, a 
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corporation failed to timely answer a| summons and complaint 
because of a change in corporate management. Plaintiff was 
awarded a default judgment, the trial pourt refused to set it 
aside, and defendant corporation appealed based upon excusable 
neglect. The Mayhew Court held: 
"it is undoubtedly correct that t^e trial court is 
endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in 
granting or denying such motions. However, it is 
also true that the court cannot aC|t arbitrarily in 
that regard, but should be generally indulgent 
toward permitting full inquiry apd knowledge of 
disputes so that they can be settl 
in conformity with law and justice.] 
ed advisedly and 
11 
Further stating: 
"The situation is patently one of the very kind for 
which Rule 60(b) was designed td grant relief. 
Accordingly, it is our conclusion that the interest 
of justice require that the motions to set aside 
the default judgments be granted and an opportunity 
afforded defendant to litigate its tights." 
And finally, in Heathman v. Fabian ^nd Clendenin, 377 P.2d 
189, a motion was brought by Appellant bringing into question the 
trial court's granting of a motion to set ^side default judgment. 
Heathman had sued his former attorney, Hatcih, claiming fraudulent 
and negligent handling of his defense in a| criminal prosecution. 
Fabian and Clendenin acted as Hatch's attorneys in Heathman v. 
Hatch. Fabian and Clendenin missed filling an answer to the 
summons and complaint by one day, allegedly because of some 
neglect of a secretary at Fabian and Clendenin. Fabian and 
Clendenin brought a motion to set aside default judgment based on 
excusable neglect. The trial court granted the motion to set 
I 
aside. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
Clearly Appellant had no actual notice of the litigation 
brought on by Respondent until notified that default judgment had 
been taken against him. Respondent's process server, in his 
first affidavit of service of process alleged only that he had 
received a copy of summons and complaint and served it on Cathy 
Russell — SEC Corporations. Rule 4(e) U.R.C.P. requires service 
of process before personal jurisdiction can be had over an 
individual or corporation. In the alternative, and only upon 
showing of reasonable diligence, if the registered agent of a 
corporation cannot be found, then 16-10-13(2) provides for an 
alternative means of service of process on a corporation. Again, 
the key test invoking the availability of 16-10-13(2) is that a 
showing of reasonable diligence must be made. Respondent did not 
meet that burden of responsibility. Therefore, the court did not 
have jurisdiction over Appellant either through 4(e) U.R.C.P. or 
16-10-13(2) U.C.A. to enter default judgment against Appellant. 
Upon Appellant's motion to set aside default and default 
judgment, the trial court allowed Respondent to amend its 
affidavit for service of process as provided for by Rule 4(h) 
U.R.C.P. Rule 4(h) U.R.C.P. provides that an affidavit of 
service of process can be amended "unless it operates as an 
injustice against the substantial rights of the party against who 
the process is issued". Clearly to allow Respondent an 
opportunity to amend its affidavit of service of process some 
four months after the fact and allege in an unsubstantiated 
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shotgun approach 40 attempts of service of process for the sole 
purpose of complying with reasonable diligence as required by 16-
10-13(2) U.C.A. was an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
Such abuse of discretion should not be alllowed by this court. 
In the final analysis, even if service of process was 
found to be perfected through 16-10-13(2)1 U.C.A. the default and 
default judgment should have nonetheless been set aside by the 
trial court. Again, Appellant had no actual notice. The only 
notice Appellant had was that a registered letter had been sent 
to it care of its registered agent by th£ Department of Business 
Regulations and returned uncollected. Appellant's failure to 
follow up on the notice of registered mai|l was excusable neglect 
as contemplated by Rule 60(b)(1) U.R.C.P. if anything was. There 
is ample case law within this jurisdiction rendered by this court 
which shows it to be an appropriate us|e of discretion by the 
trial court to set aside a default and default judgment in a case 
such as this; in the alternative, there is ample case law showing 
it to be an abuse of discretion for the triial court to fail to do 
so. Our system of justice clearly favors resolution of disputes 
after full hearing upon the merits. Appellant simply wants his 
day in court. 
Therefore, Appellant asks this courjt to remand this case 
with instructions to set aside the default and default judgment 
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and a l l o w A p p e l l a n t to p roceed upon t h e m e r i t s and advance i t s 
d e f e n s e s . 
DATED t h i s 20 th day of J u l y , ISjfiTT 
ROBERT^S-^/tfAHLE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t four (4) t r u e and c o r r e c t c o p i e s of 
t h e f o r e g o i n g were mai led p o s t a g e p r e p a i d to John Knapp B a i r d , 
M i c h a e l V e a y , C o r b i t s , B a i r d & C h r i s t e n s e n , A t t o r n e y s f o r 
R e s p o n d e n t , 215 South S t a t e S t r e e t , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
t h i s 20th day of J u l y , 1987 . 
22 
Tab A 
11 
R i c h a r d C. T e r r y (3216) 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
A t t o r n e y s fo r P l a i n t i f f 
215 Sou th S t a t e S t r e e t , S u i t e 800 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 534-0909 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIVE PLANTS, I N C . , 
a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs. 
INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
INC. , a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , 
D e f e n d a n t . 
COMPLAINT 
P l a i n t i f f c o m p l a i n s of Defendan t as f o l l o w s : 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTI0N 
1. P l a in t i f f , Native P lan ts , I n c . , i s a Utah corporation, 
with i t s pr inc ipa l place of business in Sa l t Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Defendant i s a Utah corporation doing business in Sal t 
Lake County, S ta te of Utah. Defendant entered into an obl igat ion 
with P la in t i f f to be performed in Sal t Lake County, Sta te of Utah. 
3. P la in t i f f sold and delivered! to Defendant goods and 
supplies on open account, for which Defendant agreed to pay. 
4. Defendant has f a i l e d t o pay the sum of $44 ,189 .01 , the 
reasonab le cos t s of the goods and s e r v i c e s performed by P l a i n t i f f 
for Defendant. 
5 . Demand has been made upon Defendant for payment, but 
Defendant has f a i l e d and refused to pay for the same and at t h i s 
t ime r Defendant i s l i a b l e t o P l a i n t i f f for the sum of $44,189.01 
t o g e t h e r with acc ru ing i n t e r e s t a t t he r a t e of 18%, per annum, a f t e r 
the d a t e of November 30, 1985 u n t i l paid i n f u l l . 
6 . P l a i n t i f f has been r e q u i r e d t o r e t a i n s e r v i c e s of an 
a t t o r n e y i n order t o seek compensation for the P l a i n t i f f for the 
amount of the goods and s e r v i c e s rece ived by Defendant, and i s 
t h e r e f o r e n t i t l e d t o an award of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
7 . P l a i n t i f f r e a l l e g e s paragraphs 1 through 5 as though 
f u l l y s e t f o r t h h e r e i n . 
8 . On or about the 13th and 30th days of November, 1985, 
Defendant ordered goods and s e r v i c e s more p a r t i c u l a r l y desc r ibed in 
Invoice No( s ) . 9958-001-5, 1246-001-0, and 1245-001-0, copies of 
which are a t t ached he re to as Exh ib i t "A" and incorpora ted here in by 
r e f e r e n c e . 
9 . Defendant agreed t o pay for the goods and s e r v i c e s 
ordered by t h e Defendant, t o g e t h e r with i n t e r e s t a t t he r a t e of 18%, 
per annum, on a l l unpaid i n v o i c e s . 
10. Defendant ordered goods and s e r v i c e s from the 
P l a i n t i f f , which goods and s e r v i c e s have been performed and 
d e l i v e r e d t o Defendant. 
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1 1 . Defendan t has f a i l e d t o pay fo r t h e goods and 
s e r v i c e s . The f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e of t h e same i s $ 4 4 , 1 8 9 . 0 1 . 
1 2 . Demand has been made upon t h e Defendan t fo r payment , 
b u t Defendan t ha s f a i l e d and r e f u s e d t o pay t h e same. 
1 3 . P l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o judgment a g a i n s t t he 
D e f e n d a n t f o r t h e sum of $ 4 4 , 1 8 9 . 0 1 , t o g e t h e r w i th a f t e r - a c c r u i n g 
i n t e r e s t a t r a t e of 18%, per annum, from November 30, 1905, u n t i l 
p a i d i n f u l l . 
1 4 . P l a i n t i f f has been r e q u i r e d t o r e t a i n t h e s e r v i c e s of 
an a t t o r n e y i n o r d e r t o s e e k c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r t h e P l a i n t i f f fo r t h e 
amount of t h e goods and s e r v i c e s r e c e i v e d by D e f e n d a n t , and i s 
t h e r e f o r e n t i t l e d t o an award of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTI9N 
( U n j u s t E n r i c h m e n t ) 
1 5 . P l a i n t i f f r e a l l e g e s p a r a g r a p h s 1 t h r o u g h 14 as though 
f u l l y s e t f o r t h h e r e i n . 
1 6 . P l a i n t i f f s o l d and d e l i v e r e d t o Defendan t goods and 
s e r v i c e s , which Defendan t h a s f a i l e d t o pay f o r . 
. 1 7 . Defendan t has had t h e u s e , b e n e f i t and p o s s e s s i o n of 
t h e goods and s e r v i c e s per formed by t h e P l a i n t i f f f o r t h e Defendan t 
w i t h o u t c o m p e n s a t i n g t h e P l a i n t i f f , a l l t o t h e d e t r i m e n t of the 
P l a i n t i f f . Defendan t c u r r e n t l y has t h e use and b e n e f i t of t h o s e 
goods and s e r v i c e s . 
1 8 . Defendan t has been u n j u s t l y e n r i c h e d by t h e goods and 
s e r v i c e s per formed by t h e P l a i n t i f f f o r t h e D e f e n d a n t . The amount 
of u n j u s t e n r i c h m e n t r e c e i v e d by t h e Defendan t a t t h e hands of the 
- 3 -
Pla in t i f f i s the sum of $44,189.01 f together with i n t e r e s t at the 
r a t e of 18%f per annum, from the 30th day of November, 1985, un t i l 
paid in f u l l . 
19. P l a in t i f f has been required to r e t a i n the services of 
an at torney in order t o seek canpensation for the P l a in t i f f for the 
amount of unjust enrichment conferred upon Defendant and i s therefor 
e n t i t l e d to an award of a t t o rney ' s fees , 
WHEREFORE, P l a in t i f f requests judgment as set for th below: 
• 1. On P l a i n t i f f ' s F i r s t Cause of Action for judgment 
against Defendant in the t o t a l pr inc ipa l amount of $44,189.01, plus 
i n t e r e s t at r a t e of 18%, per annum, from the 30th day of November, 
1985 u n t i l paid in f u l l , together with reasonable a t t o rney ' s fees . 
2. On P l a i n t i f f ' s Second Cause of Action, for judgment 
agains t Defendant in the t o t a l pr inc ipal amount of $44,189.01, 
together with af ter-accruing i n t e r e s t at the r a t e of 18%, per annum, 
from November 30, 1^85, un t i l paid in f u l l , together with reasonable 
a t torney ' s fees . 
3. On P l a i n t i f f ' s Third Cause of Action, for judgment 
agains t Defendant in the t o t a l pr inc ipal amount of $44,189.01 
together with i n t e r e s t at r a te of 18%, per annum, from the 30th day 
of November, 1985 un t i l paid in f u l l , together with reasonable 
a t torney ' s fees . 
- 4 -
4 . For such o t h e r and f u r t h e r r e l i e f as deemed p r o p e r by 
t h e C o u r t . 
DATED t h i s / V ^ day of J u l y , 1986 . 
CORB RIDGE, BAIRD & CHRIS TENS EN 
R i c h a r d C. T e r r y 
A t t o r n e y s ;for P l a i n t i f f 
P l a i n t i f f ' s A d d r e s s : 
417 Wakara Way 
§ a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84108 
- 5 -
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Richard C. Terry, U.S.B. No. 3216 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-0909 
'r-\ flu 
.pi,' "\ 'M
 !
^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIVE PLANTS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Civil No. INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
5t C THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT, INTERSTATE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY: — 
Defendant. 
^-^3CQ<; : 
S U M M O N S 
You are hereby summoned and required to file with the clerk 
of the above Court a written Answer to the attached Complaint, 
and to serve upon or mail to the Plaintiff's attorneyf at the 
address shown above, a copy of your Answer within twenty (20) 
days after service of this Summons upon yoii. 
If you fail to so answer, judgment by! default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint which has 
been filed with the clerk of the above Court, and a copy of which 
is attached and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this /{J^-day of J^untf, 1986. 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Defendant's Address 
425 W. Pacific Dr. 
American Fork, UT or 
8822 
Sandy, 
Richard C, 
Attorneys 
Terry 
for Plaintiff 
A l t a i r . Dr 
UT ?~/sro-< 
or... 5748 Marco 
Murray, UT 
Rd 
V 
( * • > 
1 3 <->.•=.* 
;rATE or mm > 
) SS* 
OUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) CONSTABLES RETURN 
I* BRENT K* HOOD * beirra f \ r s i duly sworn on oath depose and sayt 
I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable of the hurray Precinct, County of Salt Lake* 
fate of Utah* a c i t i z e n of ihe United States over ihe ase of 21 years at the \\®a of 
ervice herein* and not a Party to or interested in the within action* 
I received the within and hereto annexed SUHHONS & COMPLAINT on the 25 day of 
ULY * 1986* and served ihe same upon INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
within named defendant Personally known to me to be the defendant mentioned in said 
UMHONS & COMPLAINT • by delivering to and leavinq ^  true copyjof said SUHHONS & COMPLAINT 
or the defendant with RUSSELL* KATHY - SEC CORPORATIONS • a suitable person over the age of 
4 years* at the usual place of BUSINESS of said defendant* personally 
hf§ 12 rl$v ni m i m m * 1986* at 160 E* 300 S« 
ounty of Salt Lake* State of Utah* 
I further certify that at the time of such service of the SUMMONS & COMPLAINT 
endorsed the date and place of service and added my name and official title thereto* 
Dated this 12 day of SEPTEMBER, 1986 
JOHN A* SI»tDT 
Constable Murray Precinct 
<3*jed[ L^lhxL 
Deputy 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12 day of SEPTEMBER* 
IY Commission Expires! April 1* 1988* At-dl^rf ^£^^f^ 
Notary ?\&V\tjy -•.•*. County .of Salt Lake 
State of Utah' 
:ee's 
Service* i 
Mileage* t 
Mileage} 4 7*50 5748 MARCO RD** MURRAY 
3,75 
' 
, 
11 
1 
24 
>75 
.  
,25 
,50 
.75 
Mileage* * H» 8322 ALTAIR DR.. SANDY 
I 4 50 EXTRA COPIES 
TOTALS 4 
14083 15 MA 
S e p t e m b e r l b , 19 b6 
SEP 22198B 
MORMAN H. BANGERTER. GOVERNOR 
WILLIAM E. DUNN. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
RICHARD C. TERRY U.S.B. No. 3216 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
215 South S t a t e S t r e e t 
S u i t e 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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m
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STATE OF LTAH 
DEIWRTMENT OF 
BUSINESS REGULATION 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY 
PLAINTIFF 
vs 
DEFENDANT 
SALT LAKE 
NATIVE PLANTS, INC., a Utah corporation 
INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
I hereby certify that I received this summons and complaint on the 
12th riaynf September , 19 86 and that I served the 
same on the 18th day of .. September , 19 86 by 
certified mail to: 
DEFENDANT 
Address 
Dated this 
INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. 
c/o Richard W. Smith 
5748 Marco Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
18th day of. September ^ 19 86 
DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND 
COMMERCIAL COOE 
HEBER M. WELLS BLDG. . 160 EAST 300 SOUTH . P.O. BOX 45801 . SALT LAKE CUV. UTAH 84145-0801 . [801)530-6003 
TabC 
John Knapp Baird (Bar No. A0178) [ 
Richard C. Terry (Bar No. 3216) 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-0909 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIVE PLANTS INCORPORATED, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
DEFAULT CERTIFICATE 
Civil No.C, 86 05753 
Judge Russon 
In this action, the Defendant Interstate Construction 
Company has been regularly served with Summons and Complaint and 
has failed to appear and answer or otherwise respond to 
Plaintiff's Complaint; the time allowed by law for answering 
having expired, the default of Defendant Interstate Construction 
Company, is hereby entered pursuant to law. 
ATTEST my hand, and the seal of the Court, this / L 
day of l^ei/ ' , 1986. 
/ 
rc&PWM% 
1" » l_|-V» 
John Knapp Baird (Bar No. A017^V>I^ 
Richard C. Terry (Bar No. 3216) 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-0909 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH $4 &H W • £>*•*-
NATIVE PLANTS INCORPORATED, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No./£ 86 05753 
Judge Russon 
i : / ^ G^p?? 
In this action, the Defendant, Interstate Construction 
Company, has been regularly served with process, and has failed 
to appear and answer the Plaintiff1s Complaint filed herein. The 
legal time for answering has expired and the default of the 
Defendant has been duly entered according to law. Upon the 
application of Plaintiff to the above-entitled Court, judgment is 
hereby entered against the Defendant, Interstate Construction 
Company, pursuant to Plaintiff's Complaint. 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reason of the 
aforesaid, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Plaintiff be awarded judgment against Defendant, Interstate 
Construction Company as follows: 
1. $44,189.01 
7,518.18 
1,004.25 
124.76 
Principal 
Accrued interest 
Attorney's Fees 
Costs (Service and Filing 
Fees) 
$52,836.20 TOTAL JUDGMENT 
Interest shall accrue on the total judgment at the rate of 13% 
per annum from November 11, 1986, until paid in full. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to augment the above-
described judgment in the amount of reasonable costs and 
attorney1s fees expended in collecting this judgment or 
repossessing the leased property described in Exhibit "A" by 
execution, court order or otherwise. Said augmented judgment 
shall be awarded based upon affidavit of Plaintiff's counsel and 
without further notice to Defendants. 
" ~ 1986. 
:uri:ner notice to Derenaants. 
Judgment rendered S /fflS^/C)j # 
BY THE COURT: 
TabD 
James L. Christensen (A0639) 
Richard C. Terry (3216) 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-0909 
It r •* » * * ~- ^ n » m ' »JT *. 
Nov! " Hr- ! ! . ;=! 'Ki 
(jti&*r> \^J>*?fya<&7LJ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIVE PLANTS INCORPORATED, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DEFAULT 
Civijl No. 86 05753 
Judge Russon 
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Default Judgment was entered 
against the above-named Defendant, Interstate Construction Company, 
in the above-captioned Court on November 10, 1986, in the total 
amount of $52,836.20, together with intere$t accruing at the rate of 
18% per annum from November 11, 1986, unti] paid in full. 
DATED this /?** day of November, ]|986. 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
•Richard C. Terry 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Entry of Default was mailed, postage prepaid, on 
the day of , 1986, to the following: 
Interstate Construction Company 
c/o Richard W. Smith 
5748 Marco Road 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84121 
State of Utah 
Department of Business Regulation 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Post Office Box 45801 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0801 
-2 
TabE 
J. DAV'D KEL^Or (2^r«) 
DA I LEY, NELSON & CONKLIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
7050 Union Park Center, Suite 160 
Midvale, Utah B40^7 
Telephone: 561-4700 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
II! AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NATIVE PLANTS, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff , 
vs. 
INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD 
SMITH IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-86-5753 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
Comes now Richard Smith, affiant herein, who having been 
duly sworn upon his oath deposes and says: 
1. That I am and at all times material hereto have been a 
United States citizen over the age of 21 years an^ 1 a resident of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. That I have been the president and registered agent of 
the Utah corporation, Interstate Construction, Inc., since March 
8, 1967.
 m 
3. That I am also a construction superintendent for 
Interstate Construction, Inc. and am therefore involved in the 
construction activities of this company on a daily basis. 
4. That I work outside of the Salt La^e County much of the 
time, which usual]y requires that I obtain temporary lodqing at 
the locale of the construction operation, and in such instances, 
I return home only on some of tne interim weekends. 
5. That during the time period of July, 1?£6, through 
November, 1986, I was involved in several construction projects 
which required me to be out of the Salt Lake County area most of 
the time. 
6. That I never attempted to conceal myself or to avoid 
service of process by the Plaintiff in this case, as I was 
totally unaware that Plaintiff was trying to effect service of 
process upon Interstate Construction, Inc. 
1. That I recall upon returning home from a project on one 
occasion, that in the company's mail, I noticed that there was a 
notice that the company had a certified mail which was to be 
picked up at a post office. I immediately went to the post 
office to pick up the certified mail and was informed that it had 
been returned to the sender. 
8. That neither I nor any other officer, director, employee 
or agent of Interstate Construction of whom I am aware has ever 
received any copy of a summons and a complaint in the above 
entitled case by certified mail or otherwise. I did not receive 
a certified mail package containing a summons and a complaint for 
the above referenced case at any time, and I never had any notice 
or any indication of any kind that any lawsuit had been filer by 
Plaintiff against Interstate Construction, Inc. until I received 
a copy of the default judgment by mail. 
9. That Interstate Construction disputes the invoice unit 
price and the invoice quantity for the seed for which Plaintiff 
2 
claims it is entitle'! to p^ym^nt . 
10. Triht Plaintiff has failed to give Interstate 
Construction, Inc. credit for a $7,000 paympnt made previously on 
this account . 
11. That Plaintiff has failed to give Interstate 
Construction, Inc. copies of delivery tickets and invoices to 
substantiate that the seed quantity previously billed to the 
Defendant was delivered to the project. 
12. That I have previously notified Plaintiff that 
Interstate Construction is presently pursuihg a claim against the 
U.S. government for the project in question, for the increased 
price of seed which Plaintiff has assorted that Interstate 
Construction is obligated to pay and that no decision has been 
made on the claim to date. 
1?. That Interstate Construction, Inc. agreed to pay the 
higher price asserted by Plaintiff for the seed in question, only 
if Interstate Construction was successful in its claim against 
the government to collect additional sums. 
Further Affiant saith naught. 
DATED this JI day of December, 1986 * 
Richard Smith a. 
1986. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this //Uu day of December 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Resid ing at: 
\CL-r\djij L'&zJ^ 
My Commission Expires: 
i nterstate.ars 
4 
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1 
J. Davi-1 'h.-l r.on ?"»~ 5 
BAILEY, NELSON & CON"KLIN 
Attorney for Defc-:n.l.-5Pt 
7050 Union Park Center, Suite 160 
r'i'-'v.-iio, Utah H4047 
Telephone: (R01) 561-4700 
JAH?2 4 iu?M f Bl 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICf COURT 
It<' M T0 FOR F-PWT LM'F COHeTY, rr'Ai'F OF r*TM! 
PA TIVF PLANTS T ?-*Cr>PPORAr',ED , 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Defendant . 
AFFIDAVIT 
Civf1 ?":0. C-°^-d — ^ 
Ju :'^  e Ltvon < r'' Pu ^  se r 
S 7 A T F OF UT A I! ) 
ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Comes nov, Barbara Jenn Smith, ^r^inrM; h •"-•-] :'*, wh~ n-'Vi:.~ 
been duly sworn upon oath deposes and says: 
1. That I av a United St *t_s citizen over t;,e ag«- of ^ 
years and a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
?. Thai T am the wife of Ri •:: Vi rd ! C.-ni t h , the re'ji^e- ' -• 
agent of Interstate Construction. 
?. 7re~>t- T reside anr1 *t .>11 times materiel h /'.to r -\- e 
resided at 57 4 R riarco Road, Murray, Utah, which is also th-
permanent address of my husband, Pich^r.l Sroit'^, the r -v:isv r- ^ 
agent of Interstate Construction. 
4. Thr»t during the entire c ->1 ^ ndr.)r | ye* ~ 19?-, T re^id; ' 
regularly and continually at the address of 5748 Marco Road, 
Murray, Utah. That excent during the- tine period of 8: no ^.^. to 
5:00 p.m. on Monday through Fri -oyr I ai\ anl have b«>on at ho~e 
almost all of the time, including time periods when T.y husban', 
Mr. Richard ?"'it:h was oi;it of town tempor ^ ily on a or-.^i-."vr.
 # 
5. At no time since July 19, 1 ? ^ or any other time ha? 
any nrocess server, p^ac ? officer or npv oth,;r o:: r> r^\l t * V 
to our residence at 5743 Marco Road, -'urray, Utah, and attempt. 
to servo sum^^ns and complaint on my hu-sh.:vl or T-t^v-t -• 
Construction Company or inquired about doing tse same. 
Fi^rrner Affiant saith n-»u£nr. 
DATED this $ ± day of January, 1987. 
£fcn frf*1rf/y&fh?^Jl47^ 
19P7. 
SUBSCRIBED AMD SWORN to before me this P<2 day of January, 
My commission expires: 
/( jflfao 
MOT^Y PH3LIC 
Res ir- ing a t 
i^xM/ L& • 
TabG 
UNABLE TO SERVE RETURN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. Constable's Return 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, hereby, certify and return that this office received the within 
and hereto annexed SUMMONS & COMPLAINT, on the 25 day of July, 
1986, and after due search and diligent inquiry, this office was unable 
to serve the within named defendant/s, Interstate Construction Company, 
at 8822 Altair Drive in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and I 
am reliably informed and do verily believe that said defendant/s is 
unable to be served at the above address. 
Dated: This 15 day of January, 19871. 
John A. Sindt, Constable's Office, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
This office has made at least 20 attempts between the dates of July 25, 1986 
September 10, 1986 to make personal contact withjGary R. Smith at 
8822 Altair Drive, Sandy, Utah. Gary Smith was never available for service. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13 iay of January, 1987. 
My Commission Expires: 
MA C 3i. ff\«.Mt 
Notary Public County of Salt Lake 
State of Utah 
UNABLE TO SERVE RETURN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. Constable's Return 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
1, hereby, certify and return that this office received the within 
and hereto annexed SUMMONS & COMPLAINT, on the 25 day of July, 
1986, and after due search and diligent inquiry, this office was unable 
to serve the within named defendant/s, Interstate Construction Company, 
at 8822 Altair Drive in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and I 
am reliably informed and do verily believe that said defendant/s is 
unable to be served at the above address. 
This office has made at least 20 attempts between the dates of 
July 25, 1986 — September 10, 1986 to make personal contact with 
Richard W. Smith, Agent, at 5748 Marco Road, Murray, Utah. Richard W. 
Smith was never available for service. 
Dated: This 15 day of January, 1987. 
John A. Sindt, Constable's Office, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
-L-A. 
uty Constable 
J"j^ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this jo day of January, 1987, 
My Commission Expires: 
2 -to'io 
Notary Public County of Salt Lake 
State of Utah 
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